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Early Meiji Japan and Public History: Ports, Public Memory,
Gateways to Understanding through Photography
Ian Austin, Alexander Best
Introduction
Contemporary visitors, domestic and foreign, to
Japanese ports such as Yokohama, Kobe,
Nagasaki and others are able to spend several
days exploring the public history of these
gateways between Japan and the world. The
focus of the public history, of these cities,
centres primarily on their emergence during
the Meiji period (1868-1912) of Japanese
history. The story of Meiji Japan’s rise to
modern governance and the establishment of
the foundations for a modern national and
global economy has been thoroughly explored
by others and will not be retold in full here. As
works by Najita (1974, 1993), Giffard (1994),
Fallows (1995), Morris-Suzuki (1994), Samuels
(1994), Beasley (1995), Sims (2001), Andressen
(2002), Miyoshi (2005), Schuman (2009),
Studwell (2013), Tang (2011, 2014), Kasza
(2018) and others highlight, this technological
revolution on Japanese soil required the
upheaval of almost every aspect of society.
Free (2008: 15) in his seminal study on
Japanese railroad development states:

Abstract: The success of the Meiji regime elite
in placing Japan on the road to unprecedented
rapid economic development is for all to see in
the public history displayed within the port
districts of Yokohama, Kobe and Nagasaki.
Silence marks the history of how important
these port-rail-communications developments
were to the restoration of Japan’s own
sovereignty and the simultaneous stripping
away of others. This work explores the state
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Japan’s elevation to become the first nonwestern power utilising the authors
photography of the public history of Japanese
ports and their indispensable rail and
communications connections.1

Keywords: Meiji Japan, unequal treaties,
western powers, infrastructure development,
colonialism

Henceforth, the transfer of western
technology to Japan would become a
notable aspect of Japan’s interaction with
western civilization: small initially, but
accelerating at an amazing pace during
the Meiji period.

It has been observed that technological
change is a political process, and while
this certainly is often the case, in Meiji
Japan, the inverse could be argued:
political change was a technological
process (Free, 2008: 40).

The accumulative effect of which would be to
transform Japan under Emperor Mutsuhito’s
reign (1868-1912). This work will examine,
through both writing and a selection of
1
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Charter Oath (Gokajo no Goseimon) with
outlined the core objectives of the Restoration
of the Emperor: 5. Knowledge shall be sought
throughout the world so as to invigorate the
foundation of Imperial rule (Hane Mikiso as
cited in Sims, 2001: 11). The Embassy, as with
either a single individual Japanese person or a
large collective of the ruling elite, then had one
specific purpose: to accumulate knowledge that
would strengthen the emperor’s rule not only
domestically, but within any other territory
acquired under his banner. Knowledge
acquisition was to be on empirical studies with
a high level of transferability that built the
Japanese state that operated under the
emperor. For any other purpose, personal
aesthetics, pleasure or other, knowledge
acquisition was for-all-intent-and-purposes a
treasonable act. One of the two chroniclers of
the Embassy, Kunitake Kume (1871-1873, Vol
1: 4) would come to recognize that the
Embassy was both the product of and captured
forces changing not only Japan’s trajectory, but
the concert of nations:

photographs taken by the authors, the
economic and international trade history of
Meiji Japan as exercised in the port cities of
Yokohama, Kobe and Nagasaki and now only
partially reflected through public history.
This paper will show how this public history
opens avenues for the exploration of in what
ways the historic ports of Yokohama, Kobe and
Nagasaki offer a means of understanding how
the Meiji men of Japan learnt about the world
they wished to catch up with, and,
simultaneously drove seismic changes within
Japan. More specifically, Japan’s advancements
included: political, governance, agricultural
reforms, infrastructure development; and the
establishment of banking facilities to
accommodate greater foreign trade, policy
reforms in adherence with adoption of the
global default ‘gold standard’, and the
introduction of foreign human capital and
others public policy initiatives (Hoshi &
Kashyap, 2001; Plung, 2021). Ultimately,
however, the ports and their development
(including that of their essential partners in the
form of rail and the telegraph), highlights the
central driving force behind the Meiji
Restoration: the elevation of Japan to full
sovereign, strategic, economic and social
equality with the very same international
powers (Great Britain, continental European
and the United States of America) that had
denied Japan such status through the unequal
treaty system imposed upon the nation from
the 1850s onwards (Najita, 1974; Sukehiro,
1988; Auslin, 2004; Holcombe, 2011; Iokibe
and Minohara, 2017).

When we consider what has happened, we
realize that everything was related to
changes in the trend of world affairs.
Whatever knowledge was beyond the shores of
Japan that could position the emperor to
consolidate his domestic rule and elevate him
and his nation to new predominance amongst
the league of nations, it was the duty of those
sent abroad in whatever capacity to acquire it.
The Embassy would see current and future
Meiji leaders travel across the United States of
America, Great Britain and continental Europe.
Initially, the mission held the aim of revisions
to the unequal treaty system, and, to
empirically examine and document the
political, policy and developmental processes
taking place in the advanced nations that would
enable Japan to begin its ascendancy (Chang,
2002). However, the Iwakura men would come
to conclude during their early-1872 time in

The most significant expression of this national
transformation through adoption, adaptation
and development of a modern industrial
nation’s systems took place in the form of an
unprecedented (in both scale and scope)
mission abroad, the Iwakura Embassy which
took place from late-1871 to 1873 (Kume,
1871-1873; Miyoshi, 2005; Caprio, 2020). The
Embassy fulfilled the fifth element of The
2
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Washington D.C. through extensive diplomatic
dialogues (with U.S. Secretary of State
Hamilton Fish, European diplomatic figures
present in the national capital, and through
communications with Meiji diplomats in
London), that that unequal treaty revisions at
this time were undesirable. Instead, the
travellers moved concertedly and energetically
to focus the purpose of the Embassy to
extensively documenting the politics,
governance, agrarian, financial, industrial,
educational and socio-civic advantages that the
western powers held over Japan (Kume,
1871-1873; Caprio, 2020). The Iwakura
Embassy’s contemporary prominence in
Japanese public memory is highlighted by the
establishment of a park on the foreshore of
Yokohama Port area that pays tribute to the
execution
of
this
extraordinary
accomplishment.

Image 2. Japanese and English language
description of the Iwakura Mission
“Departure point of modernization of
Japan” (author supplied)

Early Meiji Period
Domestically the powerful merchant houses
that had been established during the earlier
Tokugawa Period (also known as the Edo
Period 1600-1868), like the nation itself, had
split in their support/opposition to the Meiji
elite’s Restoration of the young Emperor
Mutsuhito in 1868, and so, not surprisingly, the
new rulers of the nation felt no universal
obligation towards enhancing this classes’
advancement (Cohen, 2014). As it would prove
the Tokugawa merchant class was either
reluctant to, or simply incapable of, supplying
the vast levels of finances and human capital
required for the new industrial infrastructure
projects (such as railways and port-harbour
facilities). These investment demands rendered
short-term returns unlikely and further
accentuated the gap between the new regime’s
nation building industrial requirements and the
private sectors capabilities (Sims, 2001:6-7). As

Image 1. Iwakura Embassy Departure
Image (author supplied)
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Irrespective of the route chosen, there
remained deep concern within the government
over hostility to the recruitment of the many
foreigners needed for their expertise in rail
projects development and execution (Plung,
2021). Reactionary forces made no secret of
the fact that their tolerance of the modern and
the foreign was limited. The ports, and the
essential rail and telegraph developments,
would be the most visible physical expression
of the national changes taking place under the
new regime, and hence ripe for both verbal and
physical attack upon them. A rail spike
hammered, even more so than in the West, was
in Japan an avowedly political act (Chang,
1996, 2002; Low and Gooday, 1998; Tang,
2011; Ferguson, 2017; Kasza, 2018). Whilst in
the former ports, rail and ocean-going steam
vessels represented superiority in the form of
the industrial revolution taking place, in
developing nations like Japan which had yet to
initiate such advancements this state-of-affairs
represented an inferiority of their very being as
both a people and a nation (Chang, 2002). The
very fact that the Meiji state was able to
successfully achieve national industrialization,
development, and colonialism both disproved
Social Darwinist European thinking, and
rhetoric, and enabled the Meiji regime to
project Japanese racial superiority and these
same limitations upon their Asiatic neighbors
(Sukehiro, 1988; Iriye, 1995; Zohar, 2020). The
Meiji men never possessed doubts that they as
Japanese could achieve the developmental
levels of the Western powers; the 1860 exploits
of the Kanrin Maru under the leadership of
Admiral Yoshitake Kimura and his first
Japanese-only crew to cross the Pacific having
been a significant act of self-reinforcement. The
only real question challenge in their mind was
how fast they could catch up, and in doing so
dispense with the unequal treaty system, so as
to be on a fully equal sovereign-developmental
footing with the European industrial powers.

a result, the Ministry of Public Works was
established by the Meiji regime in the year of
its founding, 1868, to promote the introduction
of western technology into Japan and a loan
was floated in the City of London, Great
Britain’s center of banking finance, for the
building of Japan’s first railroad-telegraph line
– from Yokohama to Tokyo (Free, 2008). At this
time any dialogue on railways, ports, the
telegraph and others, like so much of the Meiji
regime policy agenda, was in fact a proxy for
the deep political domestic divisions centered
on differing visions of the nation’s future,
inclusive of the importation of ‘the foreign’ to
secure modernity (Free, 2008; Walthall, 2018).
As a result, a highly secretive meeting on the
question of Japan’s first rail line was held at the
house of Prince Sanjo Sanemtomi (1837-1891),
Minister of the Right and acting-Premier, on
December 7, 1869 (Vlastos, 1995). It would be
between the very top echelon of the Meiji
ruling elite, including Iwakura Tomobi
(1825-1883) who as a long-time confident of the
Meiji Emperor and future head of the famous
1871-1873 Embassy in his name (Caprio, 2020),
and the British Minister to Japan, Sir Harry
Smith Parkes (1828-1885: formal title Her
Majesty’s Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary and Consul General for the
United Kingdom to the Empire of Japan from
1865-1883) to decide the route options
between: Tokyo-Yokohama; Kobe-Kyoto and
Tokyo-Kyoto. At this time, and until the first
decades of the next century, Great Britain was
by-far Japan’s most important economic and
industrial partner, a position Parkes
vehemently promoted at every opportunity and
that left neither the Japanese, the Americans,
nor the continental Europeans, in any doubt of
their own relative status (Keene, 2002). In the
end, the Tokyo-Yokohama route was selected
due to the rise of Tokyo as the political center
of Japan, its commercial predominance, and the
critically the flat alluvial geography that
favored rail development (Free, 2008 Ch 3;
Tang, 2014).

To oversee not only the development of rail, but
also the ports, mines and agrarian
4
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developments to complete the supply chain,
and to secure the foreign expertise needed, the
new Meiji government established a Ministry of
Industry in December 1870 with the
increasingly powerful figure of Ito Hirobumi
(1841-1909) becoming its vice-minister in 1871
(Yoshitake, 1986; Takii, 2014; Caprio). Ito who
had already travelled overseas as a student in
London (1863) and to the United States of
America to study currency (1870) would serve
as one of Iwakura’s deputies throughout the
Embassy. Based on the experience of Ito and
others, young members of the Embassy would
remain in the United States of America and
European nations it would visit to undertake
continuing formal studies on a wide array of
areas identified as essential to the
advancement of their nation (at institutions
such as Rutgers College and the U.S. Naval
Academy at Annapolis). These individuals, or
others who had made their way to the America
and Europe as individuals or within smaller
missions and also stayed on, often for years, to
study, would return to Japan in time to take up
leading roles within the Meiji regime (for
example Tanaka Fujimaro who after the United
States would spent time touring several
European countries examining education
reform before returning to Japan in March
1873 to execute the resulting reforms through
the Ministry of Education). Despite the new
Ministry of Industry's technical assistance, easy
credit, and subsidies, the Meiji regime's initial
private-sector development drive throughout
the early 1870s was a failure. Japan at this time
was in every sense of the word a severely
underdeveloped agrarian state in relation to
the western powers, with the industrial
structures and manufactures being defined as
basic and of poor quality (Sukehiro, 1988;
Sugiyama, 1994; Andressen, 2002; Cameron,
2007; Ferguson, 2001, 2004, 2017; Green,
2017). Many private sector enterprises simply
went bankrupt due to a lack of human capital,
financial management skills and broader
knowledge of international industry and trade
requirements. This private-sector failure left

the Meiji elite with little choice other than to
take an increasingly state-interventionist
approach, including dramatically increasing its
technical transfer commitments (Morris-Suzuki,
1994; Schuman, 2009; Studwell, 2013).
Building upon the already considerable skills of
the Tokugawa artisans, technology was
acquired and learned by the Meiji regime
members through numerous other study
missions abroad. Eighteen sixty had seen the
first official Japanese mission of the Tokogawa
regime to the United States of America and in
particular the national capital of Washington
D.C. to ratify a treaty on May 22 (1860), but it
had been sent in near total secrecy, consisted
of only a few members, and had very little
impact domestically or internationally. The
Iwakura Embassy of 1871 to 1873, in stark
contrast, consisted of 70 members of the new
regime, many of whom were already or would
become significant figures within the Meiji
regime for decades to come. Envoy
Extraordinary Ambassador Plenipotentiary and
Prime Minister Iwakura Tomomi, who as stated
was a long time confident of the young
Mutsuhito, was supported by four viceAmbassadors who would themselves become
national figures: Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909),
Kido Koin (also known as Kido Takayoshi
(1833-1877)), Okubo Toshimichi (1830-1878);
and Yamaguchi Naoyoshi (1839-1894) (Kume,
1871-1873; Gluck in Miyoshi, 2005; Takii,
2014; Caprio, 2020). Far from being a secret
mission, the Iwakura Embassy’s departure from
Yokohama Port was openly celebrated by the
regime (and as evidenced by Images 1 and 2, is
still acknowledged as a seminal event in
Japanese public history) as reflecting the
nation’s moves towards sovereign equality and
modernity. Indeed, the mission’s size, scale and
duration abroad, unlike the Satsuma and
Chosun secret missions to England in 1865,
made any hope of keeping it secret from the
regime’s enemies fanciful.2
The Iwakura Embassy would quickly come to
5
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2017; Zohar, 2020).

recognize in Washington D.C. in the early
months of 1872 just how unprepared they
themselves and their nation were for any
substantive revisions to the unequal treaty
system (Kume, 1871-73; Auslin, 2004). In
relation to the latter, obtaining vast amounts of
information and knowledge on questions of
economic modernity, such as the development
of modern internal improvement such as ports
and rail, the mission was an undeniable
success. Visitors to the port of Yokohama can
learn of the Iwakura Embassy’s departure
through a small public park with several
information boards, but that in no way can tell
the whole story. As is the nature of any port the
full story encompasses both those who have
left, either permanently or to return, and those
foreigners who either entered and remained, or
themselves would depart Japan for other shores
(Plung, 2021).

The monumental cost of the foreign advisors
and the pressing need to establish economic
development as a counterweight to the loss of
sovereignty did result in substantive national
development progress. For example, through
the establishment of Regional Development
Boards, most notably the Hokkaido
Development Board (Kaitakushi) in 1871, the
Meiji State undertook agricultural, fisheries,
timber and mineral developments. All required
the development of a national network of rails,
ports, all-weather-roads, and communications
developments in the form of the telegraph
across both land and seas to secure these
gains.4

The obtaining of foreign knowledge through the
mission would be insufficient, as a lone
measure, and the Meiji regime had to at a very
heavy cost import foreign technicians as
educationalists rather than permanent
advisers. For example, by 1879 the Ministry of
Mines employed 130 foreigners whose salaries
accounted for three-fifths of the ministry's
expenditure (Reischauer and Craig, 1989:
146-148; Miyoshi 2005: 178). The emphasis
placed on the foreign advisers as
educationalists-trainers made clear the Meiji
leadership’s intent: those Japanese benefitting
from the education-training were to take over
these foreigners’ roles as soon as practically
possible to avoid dependency (as evidenced in
Images 3, 4, and 5 the influence of foreigners
was, and remains, quite clearly visible against
the traditional Japanese architecture). Such a
stand fell within the broader political economy
context of the regime itself with Japan having
lost substantial elements of its sovereignty
under the unequal treaty system and the Meiji
leadership’s extensive knowledge of European
and American colonialism in broader Asia 3
(Iriye, 1995; Auslin, 2004; Pilling, 2014; Green,

Image 3. Kobe Akarenga Souko Red Brick
Port Warehouses (author supplied)
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a pragmatic response on the part of the Meiji
government elite to both domestic and
international political, strategic, and economic
imperatives (Cameron, 1997; Bix, 2000; Pyle,
2007; Teramoto and Minohara, 2017).

The Meiji Governing Elite
Substantial studies of the contemporary
Japanese elite bureaucracy acknowledge that
its key characteristics were all formed in the
Meiji period (Beasley, 1988; Beasley, 1995;
Koh, 1989; Johnson, 1982, 1995). The Ministry
of Finance (MoF), established in 1868, the year
of the Restoration, and the Ministry of Industry,
established in 1881, have been the mostthoroughly internationally documented. 5
Having observed through the seminal Iwakura
Embassy and a series of smaller missions of the
British, American, and German administrative
elite, and in particularly those responsible for
the national budgetary process, the Meiji
regime framed its substantive reforms within
the context of embracing the Confucian
tradition. The Meiji elite moved to institute
national civil-service examination system in
1880. For the Meiji elite this selection into their
ranks via rigorous examination legitimised
public officials with moral authority as servants
of the Emperor to promote the public good
including the development of internal
improvements, state enterprises and the
harnessing of ‘private’ enterprises deemed
central to securing the nation’s sovereignty and
prosperity (Johnson, 1982, 1995; Muchlhoff,
2014).

Image 4. Yokohama Akarenga Souko “Red
Brick Warehouse” (author supplied)Image
5. First Foreign Settlement Site
(Yokohama) (author supplied)

Image 5. First Foreign Settlement Site
(Yokohama) (author supplied)

During this era of small government, the period
of 1885-1889 saw investment in fixed capital
increase above 15 percent of total government
expenditure, and 1.7 percent of the GNP. By
the end of the period, 1910 to 1914, with the
Meiji reign coming to an end in 1912,
investment in fixed capital would rapidly
expand to 27.7 percent of total government
expenditure and 4.5 percent of the GNP
(Yasuba and Dhiravegin, 1985: 21-25). This
change was not ideologically driven but instead

Having removed the samurai as a class and
abolished their daimyo provincial loyalties, the
Meiji elite redirected loyalty ties to the central
bureaucracy as separate fiefdoms in
themselves (Miyoshi, 2005: 91). Traditional
clan loyalty based on geographic locations was,
over the duration of the Meiji Emperor’s reign,
to be replaced with another form of clan
loyalty; one based on educational attainment,
7
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and which transcended government and found
its way across all the nation’s major
corporations in state banking, finance, rail,
ports, manufactures and others (Fingleton,
March/April 1995: 77). The Meiji state
requirement to build the internal improvements
needed to secure Japan’s rise in international
stature saw the bureaucracy almost double
between 1880 and 1890. Further from 1890 to
1903 administrative expenditure grew from 31
million to 121 million and government
employees grew from 79,000 to 144,000 (Sims,
2001: 65 & 91-92). The continuity of Japan’s
bureaucratic structures can be traced
accurately (Johnson, 1995).

is important to understand that whilst the MoF
stood at the apex of the Meiji regime
bureaucratic hierarchy, it was ultimately under
the authority of the Emperor. Mutsuhito more
than once would show a willingness to reign-in
his senior governing elite, including those
overseeing the MoF, when he felt the state
revenue-expenditure balance had reached a
precipitous. This was particularly so during the
first decades of his reign (1870s-1890s) (Keen,
2002). The MoF, nevertheless, went further
than mere mastery over the bureaucracy and
established its grip over the national economy
through embedding its alumni into the nation’s
major state and ‘private’ corporations, inclusive
of the banking and trade entities that drove
Japan’s engagement with the world, as a
continuation of their loyalty to their Emperor
and by extension their MoF clan (Patrick, 1965;
Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001).

Under the 1890 Constitution's diffusion of
power, the system by which every ministry
jealously guards its nawabari (sphere of
influence) and all ministry members develop
nawabari ishiki (territorial consciousness) was
formally instituted. The primary vehicle for this
institutionalisation of bureaucratic divisions
were (and remain) intense competition over the
national budget. At the apex of this new clan
loyalty was the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the
guardian of the nation’s finances through its
control of the state budget. The 1890
Constitution institutionalised this MoF
bureaucratic elite predominance as it placed a
decisive limitation upon the powers of the Diet,
one borrowed from Berlin in that if it failed to
pass the national budget the government could
continue its operation based on the preceding
year’s budget (Storry, 1978). The MoF, in
practice, held the whip hand over the Diet and
would maintain the 1890 budgetary
constitution to control the Meiji government
apparatus with all other bureaucratic
institutions and agencies required to pass their
own ministry budgets through MoF scrutiny.
All nation building projects, including the
development of ports, rail, the telegraph, allweather roads, the establishment of trade
financing and logistics entities, all were either
driven from, or required, the explicit approval
and financing of the MoF. Critically, though it

The rise of the MoF was not ideological but
strategically pragmatic as it was only utilised
when it was deemed essential to the national
interests, with the Meiji elite preferring to use
the private sector where applicable and to
engage in state intervention through the MoF
and other Meiji agencies for the building of rail
and ports only when the market proved itself
incapable of delivering nation-building. A
working model of private-driven rapid nationbuilding economic development, however, did
not present itself. The MoF's direct control over
an economic base independent of the private
sector, including the banking sector and a vast
array of state-owned enterprises, provided the
bureaucratic elite with strategic control over
capital, materials, labour and national
economic planning (Chu, 1994:118). Ex-officials
from the MoF would come quickly to dominate
the executive level within both public and
‘private’ financial, internal improvements, rail,
ports, roads, the telegraph, and other
institutions (institutions such as the Japan
Development Bank (JDB); Export-Import Bank
of Japan (EIBJ); Tokyo Stock Exchange; Bank of
Tokyo; Yokohama Bank; and others). Japan’s
8
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the required internal improvement, such as
corresponding deep-water ports and the rail
networks needed to supply the coal, iron ore,
timber and other resources, along with the
construction and maintenance of these colossal
state investments (Keene, 2002). In this, the
Meiji Emperor and his leading men were
systematic in following the actions of the
United States, Britain and continental Europe,
actions many themselves had witnessed firsthand through extensive study tours (Kume,
1871-1873). The Railway Construction Act of
1892 coordinated a national network which
rose in the 1883 to 1903 period from 245 miles
to 4,500 miles, with 70 percent being
constructed by private-enterprise, and, in 1906,
state ownership was secured through the
Railway Nationalisation Bill (see Table).

action in fact mirrored those of London, Berlin
and Washington D.C., in that they
pragmatically evaluated their own contextual
environment and circumstances and adopted,
adapted and developed old and new policy and
practice models and behaviors to achieve
eventual success. As this study has detailed the
Meiji men observed and extensively
documented first-hand through the Iwakura
Embassy and other smaller missions the
development of the advanced western states
public
policy-financial-industrial-trading
practices and institutions, and quickly came to
conclude that far from being the product of
Adam Smith’s invisible hand of the market, the
international powers’ predominance in arms,
finance and trade was in fact the product of the
long-term concerted actions of the respective
state-activist elites driving these respective
nations (Kume, 1871-1873; Fukui, 1992; Iriye,
1995; Takii, 2014).

Ports, Shipping,
Communication

Railways

and

In recognition of their military importance to
Japan, the Meiji elite developed railways,
shipping and communication services (domestic
and international postal services/telegraph)
through the use of both government-andprivate enterprises to achieve projects of
national significance. For example, Emperor
Mutsuhito himself took a deep personal interest
in every aspect of Japan’s development of a
deep-water navy, with Japan’s first western
battleship being purchased from the United
States of America. This was hardly surprising
when one considers that it was the naval power
of the United States of America, Great Britain
and other western powers that completely
discredited the Tokugawa regime’s capacity to
protect the nation and therefore its legitimacy
to rule. Mutsuhito’s studies extended to
undertaking extensive personal studies of both
western powers’ battleship developments and

Image 6. Cornerstone/foundation stone of
the Port of Yokohama (author supplied)

Along with this rapid development in internal
improvement, a similar pattern of incentives
and penalties was used in ports, rail,
shipbuilding, communication, electrical
industries, textiles, low-end tool manufactures,
steam-machinery and later chemical, metal
products, and machinery. Through the direct
import and development of British technology,
the textile sector (at first silk production and
exportation), in particular, expanded to occupy
9
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nearly 30 percent of value-added manufactures
throughout the 1890 to 1930 period, the next
largest, at 16 percent, was food and drink
(Beasley, 1995: 110; Reischauer and Craig,
1989: 149). Under the new Meiji policy-loan
scheme the increase in the share of total
manufacturing output in the GDP grew from
13.7 percent in 1873-1874 to 43.7 percent in
1930-1939. Furthermore, through sustained
technological importation and innovation,
manufacturing rose from 6 percent of the gross
domestic product (GDP) by 1900 to 30 percent
by 1945. Fukui, 1992: 202.

supplied)

Table: Meiji Infrastructure Development 1868-1912: Transportation
(Rail, Ports and Steam Vessels) and the Communications Revolution
(the Telegraph) takes shape Japan.

Image 7. Public history of Yokohama’s
original railway service between Yokohama
and Shinagawa, displayed at Sakuragicho
Station (author supplied)

Image 8. C11 292 steam locomotive
outside Shimbashi Station, Minato (author
10
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• National-Political: Rail, Ports and the Telegraph would tie the nation
together and enabled the Meiji regime through a network of rail-telegraph to
expand its reach into the most remote of villages. The Meiji elite coming from
isolated regional provinces themselves fully understood the political
importance of rapid and effective communication from the centre to the
periphery, and vice versa to the permanency of their regime.
• The first railway link, from Tokyo to Yokohama, was solely governmentfunded under the Japan Railway Company (Nihon Tetsudo Kaisha) which itself
was under the Ministry of Civil Affairs, with material-and-technical services
provided by Great Britain. The budget was a truly astronomical £300,000 with
British technology and expertise predominant, yet construction quality was
often poor because of the inexperience of the Japanese workforce who would
learn-by-doing. It would be an outright success with its first full year of
operation 1873 (indecently 43 years after rails introduction in Britain): 1,
223,071 passengers: ¥395,988 in revenue with costs of ¥117,879. Frequency
increased from 6 to 9 times daily: Freight was introduced in September 1873
(Free, 2008).
• The Tokyo-Yokohama would see travel and transportation times in Japan go
from 20 miles a day to 20-35 miles an hour. Japan had moved from the humanhorsepower era that had existed for millennia into a new era of steam. In
contemporary terms it was the equivalent to the quantum advancements
taking place in relation to private enterprise space travel. An American R. P.
Bridgens would be the foreign specialist architect who designed the original
Shimbashi and Yokohama stations (Free, 2008).
• The Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto line would be next and by December 1871 the survey
line had been staked-out. In December 1873 authorization to begin
construction of the line was given and involved extensive infrastructure
development within the Kobe port itself and a series of through wrought iron
river crossing bridges to be constructed. The Kobe-Osaka link was finalized in
May 1874 and was extended further to Kyoto in September 1876.
• National-Strategic: The rail-ports-telegraph nexus would enable the
movement of Imperial troops, arms and other military resources across the
nation in the most efficient manner possible to crush any domestic uprisings.
The Meiji men were more than aware through extensive studies of the
decisive role rail had played in delivering the Union military victory over the
Confederacy in the American Civil War (1861-1865) and the increasing role of
rail in continental European conflicts, including Bismarck’s decisive use of rail
in the Franco-German War of 1870.
• The critical role of rail-ports-telegraph in delivering strategic power would
come to full fruition domestically when it proved decisive in crushing the
Satsuma rebellion in 1877. The Meiji regime victory, and in particular the
capacity of the Imperial Army and Navy to deliver unprecedented levels of
men, arms and other resources to the battlefield through rail, ports and the
telegraph, ended internal rebellion.
• The crushing of the Satsuma Rebellion was to be the logistical schooling the
Meiji regime would utilise for Japan’s movement of troops and resources via
the development and advancement of rail, ports, the telegraph and steampowered ocean-going vessels to Taiwan, Korea, Southern Manchuria, and
China in the coming decades (Chang and Myer, August 1963). The port-railtelegraph developments that had taken place throughout the 1870s-1780s
would be replicated by Meiji men in these new colonial territories for the
advancement of their nation’s interests.
• In 1887, private capital was attracted by extending State assurances of
capital return through railway-monopoly licenses, and re-nationalisation after
twenty-five years.
• The Railway Construction Act of 1892 saw the national network rise from
245 miles (1883) to 4,500 miles (1903), with 70 percent being constructed by
private enterprise.
• In 1906, state ownership was secured through the Railway Nationalisation
Bill (Crawcour. 1988: 394).
The Telegraph
• Commodore William Perry on his second trip to Japan in 1854 (Iokibe and
Minohara, 2017) presented the Tokugawa shogunate with an embossing
Morse Telegraph transmitter:
“After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, government leaders quickly decided to
make the establishment of a telegraph service one of their top priorities. Two
years later, a telegraph service between Tokyo and Yokohama was provided
for the general public. The telegraph service expanded rapidly, and a nationwide network was completed by 1878. Members of the Embassy (1872) were
eager to meet and honour Morse; to their deep regret, he was taken ill and
died while they were in Washington” (Editors in Kume, 1871-1873 Vol. 1: 80).
• In mid-1872 a new telegraph line from Nagasaki to Shanghai to London to
New York meant that news from Tokyo was quickly transmitted to Nagasaki
and onto the rest of the world. An event in Tokyo could now be reported
within a New York or Dutch newspaper 2 days later and vice versa. The Meiji
Emperor and his inner circle were now able to be fully informed of events
globally, most importantly strategic and military events amongst the great
powers, like never before and would respond to these with new policies and
initiatives reflective of the new speed of information.
• Between 1883-1913 post offices rose from 3,500 to 7,000; 2.7 million
telegrams in 1882 rose to 40 million in 1913; telephones which were
introduced in 1890 with 400 subscribers and only two exchanges, by 1913
reached 200,000 subscribers with 1,046 exchanges. The government backed
Tokyo Electrical Company expanded from 21,000 lamps in 1890 to 5 million in
1913 (Sydney, 1988: 394).

Image 9. Plaque commemorating the
centenary of the commencement of
international postal service from
Yokohama Port (author supplied); 5-3
Nihonodori, Naka Ward, Yokohama,
Kanagawa 231-8799, Japan.

Meiji International Trade Policy
Japan's international trade policy, as an
extension of its national elite's ideology of
Kokutai and broader industrial policy, has
enjoyed continuity. Japan's Meiji leaders and
their successors have been "well aware that the
country's power and prestige were hostage to
its ability to promote foreign trade" (Duus,
1988: 25). Unless Japan could undertake
expansion of its manufacturing industries and
sell its goods in the world market, it could not
acquire the armaments and materials needed to
secure its hold on power, and in time its
expanding empire. The Japanese elite
pragmatically acknowledged that they operated
in a mercantile international environment
dominated by the trading powers of Great
Britain, The United States of America and
continental Europe (Young, 1877-1879).
Following the precedent set by
Prussian/German administrators, export credit
secured primarily through special banks
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operating under the purview of the MoF was
utilised by the Meiji elite to achieve rapid trade
development. The Meiji regime instituted
export associations, establishing the Yokohama
Specie Bank (1892) to facilitate foreign
exchange transactions, subsidise export
industries, strengthen consular economic
reporting and construct an ocean-going
merchant marine.

depicts).

The Meiji elite divided trade strategy and the
world into two separate spheres: one for trade
and one for conquest. From the industrial
world (Britain, Europe and the United States),
it sought to acquire manufacturing technology
and semi-manufactured goods and, in return,
export primary goods (silk and tea) and labourintensive craft products (Chang 1996, 2002).
To the non-industrial world, primarily their
Northeast and Southeast Asian regional
neighbours, the Meiji elite in the early years of
the regime sought to export inexpensive lightindustry products, such as cotton, textiles and
other assorted manufactured goods, and, in
return, purchase raw materials and foodstuffs.
In time through its colonial actions against it
near-neighbours this process would be one of
forced distribution and acquisition (Chang,
1963; Duss, 1995; Zohar, 2020; Tinello, 2021).
While introducing importation regulations that
assured technological transfer in relation to
value-added products, the Meiji state
advocated the open importation of raw
materials for manufacturing. This is hardly
surprising, as, with its limited-resource base,
Japan found it imperative to maintain an open
raw-material trade/forced acquisition
(Yoshitake, 1986; Iriye, 1995; Teramoto and
Minohara, 2017). Images 10 and 11 represent
enduring examples of the early infrastructure
through which the Meiji trade strategy was
made possible. The Meiji men would make full
use of their predecessor’s connections with the
Dutch trading empire, utilising this knowledge
as a platform upon which to build relations with
the British Empire, United States of America,
and continental European powers (as Image 11

Image 10. Pictograph along the Nakashima
River of the Nagasaki Canal Trading and
Warehouse system (author supplied); 8
Uonomachi, Nagasaki, 850-0874, Japan.

Image 11. Current construction HSBC,
built 1904, Former site Dutch Trading
Quarters Nagasaki Dutch Trading House
(author supplied); 4-27 Matsugaemachi,
Nagasaki, 850-0921, Japan

Japanese shipping would begin regular trade
throughout East and Southeast Asia in the
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1880s and with it came the Keiretsu, state
banks and consular offices, all supported by the
State Japanese Associations (Nihonjinkai). The
easy-credit terms Japanese banks extended to
Chinese enterprises ensured that, unlike their
western counterparts, Japanese enterprises
secured the Chinese-business networks
throughout Southeast Asia. At the same time
(1880s-90) the international-trade climate saw
the major developed countries, including the
United States, Britain and Germany, turn their
backs on the limited free trade regime in
existence and instead engage in increasing
levels of mercantile public policy. This
macroenvironmental shift in global trading
conditions in turn forced the Meiji regime to
maintain state finance-trade intervention in the
form of extending finance across state-owned
port, rail, telegraph, merchant marine and
other trade-oriented development (Hoshi, 1995;
Bix, 2000).

Image 12. Pictograph of the second arrival
of Commodore Perry to Yokohama, located
outside of the ‘Yokohama Archives of
History’ Building (author supplied)

Japan's Meiji leaders, having come to power as
a direct response to their Tokugawa
predecessor’s failure to maintain trade
sovereignty in the face of the western imposed
unequal treaties (1854 onwards), were "well
aware that the country's power and prestige
were hostage to its ability to promote foreign
trade" (Duus, 1988: 25). The Meiji elite having
been the subject of western superior naval
arms understood that unless Japan could sell its
goods in the world it could not acquire the
arms (modern rifles, artillery and shipping)
needed to protect itself, enact its own
sovereignty, and when possible, establish a
future East Asian empire designed to enable a
mass expansion of manufacturing and heavy
industries. Only a network of domestic and
regional port-rail-telegraph and other internal
improvement infrastructure could secure this,
and so, they were deemed to be nation-building
projects by the Meiji men who cared little if
they were enacted under either state or private
activism but cared entirely that they come to
timely fruition.

The Meiji elite divided trade strategy and the
world into two separate spheres. From the
industrial world (Britain, the United States and
continental Europe), it sought to acquire
manufacturing technology and semimanufactured goods and from the nonindustrial world (primarily its Asian regional
neighbours) it purchased raw materials and
foodstuffs. Even before it established itself as
colonial ruler of Taiwan in 1890, and later
Korea in 1910, through state-financing
Japanese shipping began regular trade
throughout East Asia in the 1880s. Doing so
through its forced acquisition of the Loo-Choo
Islands (incorporated into the Okinawa
Prefecture) in the late-1870s (Shuman, 2009;
Studwell, 2013; Pilling, 2014; Ch’oe, 2015).
With the Meiji-elite-driven expansion of East
Asian shipping trade came further statesupport for the Keiretsu trade enterprises via
State banks, extensive consular offices and
officials and a network supported through the
State Japanese Associations (Nihonjinkai). The
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Japanese elite from 1868 until 1912 and
onwards then pragmatically acknowledged the
obvious; that they operated in a mercantile
international environment dominated by the
trading powers of Great Britain, the United
States of America and an expansionary
Germany, all of whom had either taken colonies
or trade-concessions in the East Asian region
(Tinello, 2021; Caprio, 2020; Zohar, 2020).

railways, postal and telegraph networks and
vast internal improvements across the Japanese
landscape being not an economic imperative in
themselves but instead were the manifestation
of the core national geo-political strategic
directive: the restoration of the full sovereignty
of the nation under the Emperor’s rule.
Even with Meiji-European powers treaty
revisions in the first decade of the twentieth
century, that restored much of the sovereignty
Japan had long been denied, equality between
the rising Asian power and the established
international powers would prove elusive. The
western powers, even after the Japanese
Navies’ defeat of Russian forces in 1905, held
firm on the belief that they held ascendancy
within the international realm in perpetuity
(Kowner, 2022). To do otherwise was to
acknowledge that it was not their race and
their belief in the inherent superiority, it
bestowed upon them, that made colonialism a
legitimate act of international public policy but
simply their current position within the
industrial revolution that delivered to them
superior arms: and this the western powers
simply could not do. Their entire domestic and
international regimes, inclusive of political,
economic and social structures, relied upon this
self-perception of racial superiority. This racedevelopmental advancement nexus would be no
less the case than with the Meiji men as they
commenced Japan’s construction of its East
Asian sphere of influence, and their successors
drive towards war across Asia and ultimately
unconditional defeat in 1945 (Chang and Myer,
1963; Duus, 1995).

Conclusion: Meiji Japan’s Emergence as a
World Economic Power
The images presented in this paper highlight
and corroborate a public historical analysis
enshrined in the enduring physical
manifestations of the efforts of the Meiji
government’s concerted nation building. These
physical manifestations are critically important
to understanding the history of Japan’s rise to
developed nation status, but do not in of
themselves tell the entire story of domestic
political power struggles that themselves
derived from the international powers’
dynamics, inclusive of being both subjected to
and the executor of colonialism, occupation,
and coercion, and eventually efforts toward full
sovereignty. Contemporary Japanese society
would not be possible without the efforts
represented by the physical manifestations of
Meiji history, which remain visible if even
presented as a largely silent history to the
citizens of Japan and its many visitors.
Japan, like all the other colonial powers, in
extending its imperial ambitions defined its
self-serving actions as very much within the
‘norm’ of international affairs (Ch’oe, 2015).
Unlike the other colonial powers, however, it
did so whilst it itself was the subject of
colonialism in the form of the western state
imposed unequal treaty system. Under such an
international paradigm, the full restoration of
national sovereignty stood at the apex of all
state thinking and policy activity. The physical
creation of import-export banks, ports,

The success of the Meiji regime elite in placing
Japan on the road to unprecedented rapid
economic development is for all to see in the
public history displayed within the port
districts of Yokohama, Kobe and Nagasaki.
Silence marks the history of how important
these port-rail-communications developments
were to the restoration of Japan’s own
sovereignty and the simultaneous stripping
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away of others. As stated above these
developmental achievements were the product
of the larger goal of national sovereignty and
crucially were the product of the Meiji elite
being left to its own domestic reform agenda.
Whilst limited in key areas because of the
western powers imposition of the unequal
treaty system, the Meiji men were able to
implement public policy that was ultimately
pragmatic, quickly altering policies when they
proved to be detrimental to state building and
economic development and pursuing with
vigour those deemed essential to national
sovereignty and security (Kume, 1871-1873;
Yoshitake, 1986). In the international realm the
ports-rail-telegraph nexus would prove critical
to enacting colonialism over Taiwan and Korea
largely uninterrupted from western power
interference, and further into Manchuria and
China which in stark contrast met with fierce
western powers resistance (Ch’oe, 2015;
Teramoto and Minohara, 2017).

unequivocal message from the western naval
submission of Satsuma and Chosun and
international events such as China’s
humiliation at the hands of the industrial
western powers and the Lincoln-led industrial
northern victory over the southern plantocracy
was the same: to remain an agrarian society
was for Japan to be in perpetuity a mere pawn
to the western financial-industrial nationstates. Put simply they acknowledged that you
either became a power within the international
realm, or you became a vassal state: with no
real space in-between (Yoshitake, 1986; MorrisSuzuki, 1994; Fallows, 1995; Caprio, 2020;
Zohar, 2020; Tinello, 2021).
The Meiji regime, therefore, would forge a
trading system of export-financing, port
infrastructure, rail and postal services/the
telegraph celebrated today in public memory,
that itself relied on the development and the
strengthening of the state institutional capacity
(governance, public policy execution, financial
institutions, legal structures, private incentive
systems, human-capital development and
others) to ensure that this fate did not befall
the Japanese nation (Masuyama, 1999: 16). The
Meiji men did not require any theoretical
exploration as to the essential nature of
infrastructure development to their nation and
their regime’s future. They themselves had
been subjected to the power that the western
industrial states could extend globally through
their development of ports, rail and the
telegraph, whilst their massive near regional
neighbor, China, was experiencing its
nineteenth century fate of being picked apart
by the European powers precisely because of
the collective failure of that nation’s leadership
to execute effective internal improvements that
would have enabled a large modern Chinese
army and navy and resources through rail, port
and communications (telegraph and other)
developments to strategically counter this
foreign encroachment.

International events would be critical to the
Meiji regime’s thinking, and as military men
themselves they keenly observed success in
this field, so they took particular interest in the
European powers’ colonial actions towards
China from the 1840s onwards, the Union
victory over Southern secessionist during the
American Civil War (1861-1865) and
Bismarck’s Prussian army’s crushing of France
(1870-1871). In fact, the lesson of western
might and power came to these men on their
own shores. Whilst the industrial superior
Union was at war with its rebellious southern
countrymen it also made time in 1864 to join a
flotilla of western naval power consisting of
Britain, France, the Netherlands and itself to
comprehensively dismantle the defences of the
Choshu domain through sheer superior
arms. In the year prior (1863) the British Royal
Navy alone had bought the Satsuma domain to
a position of forced negotiation. It was no
accident that it was from these two domains,
Satsuma and Chosun, that the majority of the
Meiji regime men heralded from. The clear and
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Chang, Han-Yu and Ramon H. Myer. (1963)
Aug. "Japanese Colonial Development Policy in
Taiwan, 1895-1906". The Journal of Asian
Studies. 22(4). pp. 433-449.
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Notes
1

The authors of this work would like to thank Professor Mark E. Caprio of Rikkyo University,
Japan, for his review of the paper which contributed to its improvement in every sense.
2
Under the Tokugawa regime unauthorised travel abroad saw the death penalty applied to
anyone who returned home. Even those who made no conscious decision to leave, like
fishermen swept away from Japan by vicious storms found themselves having to reside on
foreign soil, never able to return under fear of execution.
3
On July 29th, 1858 the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the United States had been
signed on the U.S. Frigate Powhatan in Edo Bay with the inequity in military power between
the two actors being abundantly clear to all.
19

20 | 14 | 2

APJ | JF
4

Nagasaki, Hiroshima, Kobe, Yokohama, Aomori, Hokkaido and other ports development, and
Japan’s connection to the international trans-oceanic telegraph cable all proceeded apace
under Meiji governance.
5
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and Ministry of Finance (MoF).
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